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Collective Bargaining Perspectives 
Alton W J . Croig 
and 
Harry J. Waisgtass 
After an examination of the socio-economic environ-
nent within which collective bargaining functions, the 
authors study the parties involved, the structures of nego-
tiating units, the procédures for resolving conflicting 
interest disputes. They also présent some of the major 
outputs of the collective bargaining System and formulate 
a few suggestions about the future functionning of col-
lective bargaining and the rôle and structures of union 
and other groups within the system. 
Introduction* 
c Collective bargaining perspectives » is a very broad and all-
encompassing topic which could in itself be the major thème for a 
two-day conférence of this type. Since our paper is to serve as a back-
ground paper for an intensive analysis of union structure, we shall 
attempt, therefore, in a modest way to highlight what we believe to be 
some of the major factors in our collective bargaining system which 
hâve relevance to a discussion of union structure. 
We propose to proceed by dis-
cussing the following factors : 
1) the current socio-economic 
environment within which 
collective bargaining func-
tions; 
* The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not neces-
sarily reflect the thinking or policy of the Canada Department of Labour. 
We wish to acknowledge the assistance given to us by Messrs. F.J. McKendy, 
R.J. Christy, Emam Khan and D.V. Brazier. 
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2) the parties involved in the collective bargaining process; 
3) the structure of negotiating units and the procédures for re-
solving conflicting interest disputes; 
4) some of the major outputs of the collective bargaining System 
for which we hâve empirical data, and; 
5) some suggestions of a spéculative nature about the future func-
tioning of collective bargaining and the rôle and structure of 
unions and other groups within the System. 
Significatif Socio-Economie Environmental Considérations 
Since collective bargaining functions within the framework of a 
complex socio-economic environmental, it is necessary that we discuss 
some of the major environmental factors affecting the opération of our 
collective bargaining System. One of the more fundamental environ-
mental factors which will increasingly affect collective bargaining is 
the growing public commitment to a goal-setting society. The goals 
of full employment, a high rate of économie growth, reasonable price 
stability, a viable balance of payments and équitable distribution of 
rising incomes hâve become subjects of increasing public discussion and 
commitment since they were first articulated by the Economie CouncI 
of Canada. 
The extrême difficulties of harmonizing the policies and coor-
dinating the programs for the attainment of thèse goals are generally 
well recognized. Our future progress in achieving our goals will dépend 
in very large measure on our ability to innovate new processes, structures 
and institutions for créative decision-making. This will involve labour, 
management and governments in complex inter-relationships that con-
front, clarify and résolve multi-dimensional conflicts of interest, rights 
and expectations. 
Second, Canadian society has become an affluence-oriented one. 
We hâve high aspirations and expectations. This reflects, in part, the 
demands of a younger and more mobile génération which has grown 
up in the midst of prosperity and which has not been subject to the 
hardships of a major dépression and the discipline of military service 
572 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 23, No. 4 
during a major war. Ours is a society which very reluctantly subor-
dinates individual needs and aspirations to national needs and aspi-
rations. 
In this kind of society, there is a need to assert the public interest 
and to assert it more vigorously in the reconciliation that must take 
place between public and private interests. There is a need to articulate 
our social goals at least as clearly as our économie goals, and to get the 
widespread acceptance, understanding and support for them that is 
required for effective collaboration between governmental and non-
governmental organizations. 
Third, we are living in a society characterized by rapid changes 
in technology, économies, and the social fabric of our nation. Our 
Institutions, structures and processes, on the other hand, tend to function 
in the more traditional ways and face a serious challenge to adapt to 
changing fmictions. Since we hâve control over thèse, we are challenged 
to create new ones to meet new needs and to adapt to change quickly 
and decisively. There is also the présent challenge to make decentralized 
deeision-making serve national goals, while maintaining the satisfaction 
of individual freedom and the advantages of local autonomy. 
Fourth, during the past six years or so we hâve experienced an 
unprecedented period of prosperity accompanied by increasing priées 
and costs. In order to compete in international markets, particularly 
as the Kennedy round tariff changes progressively go into effect, we 
must improve our productive efficiency and keep our priées and costs 
under control in order to maintain the compétitive advantages that we 
now enjoy. Finance Minister Benson, speaking in Montréal recently, 
termed inflation as Canada's major problem and proposed a wagè-price 
review board as part of the solution to the problem. He stated that the 
board's opinions would also serve as a « guide to the direction of future 
tariff or tax changes. » * 
Finally, our social security System comprises a patchwork of over-
lapping public and private programs. Consequently, a change in any 
public program lias a significant impact on our collective bargaining 
system. You will recall the problems which arose over negotiated pension 
plans when the Canada Pension Plan was introduced. 
Thèse are but a few of the many important environmental factors 
which hâve affected, and which will continue to affect, our collective 
(1) FRANK HOWARD, « Benson Ternis Inflation Canada's Major Problems», 
Globe and Mail May 25, 1968, p . B l . 
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bargaining System. Let us now turn to a discussion of the parties in 
collective bargaining. 
The Parties in the Collective Bargaining System 
The major parties in any collective bargaining System are labour, 
management, and governments — the latter representing the public 
interest. We shall look at each of thèse but briefly. 
At the beginning of 1967, union membership in Canada stood at 
1,921,000; this represented 32.3 percent of the non-agricultural paid 
workers in Canada and 26.1 percent of the total labour force. Member-
ship in unions affiliated with the CLC totalled 1,451,000 and there were 
198,000 in CNTU affiliâtes. A récent estimate by our Labour Orga-
nizations Division suggests that if teachers, nurses, provincial civil 
servants, and police (ail of whom are engaged in some form of collec-
tive bargaining) are added, the total would currently be about 2.4 
million. This would represent about 40 percent of the non-agricultural 
paid workers and 33 percent of the overall labour force. With this 
degree of organization, trade unionism represents a significant potent 
force in our country. 
Union membership figures do not tell the whole story, however. 
Equally important — if not more so — is the structure of unions which 
is the main thème of this two-day conférence. There are 110 interna-
tional unions in Canada, 93 of which are affiliated with the CLC. In 
addition, there are 55 national unions, 20 of which are affiliated with 
the CLC and 13 with the CNTU. The affiliâtes of both central labour 
bodies are fairly autonomous organizations. Although the CNTU 
appears to exercise more control over its affiliâtes than does the CLC, 
a crucial question is whether either of the two central bodies speaks 
foi, and exercise sufficient control over its affiliâtes to influence the 
direction and implementation of national policies and programs in a 
goal-setting society. The problem may be further compounded by the 
fact that most of the CLC affiliâtes are parts of international unions 
with headquarters in the United States. In addition, the local unions 
of international unions operating in Canada exercise considérable 
autonomy. 
For example, if the fédéral government should proceed with what 
Mr. Benson calls a « sélective priées and incomes policy, » 2 what 
functions can and will labour organizations play in setting the précise 
(2) Ibid. 
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goals for this policy and assisting in its implementation ? Assuming 
that the central labour bodies, along with management and government, 
can agrée upon a policy, do the central labour bodies hâve sufficient 
authority over their affiliâtes and the thousands of local unions across 
Canada to implement such a policy ? We hâve no ready answer to 
this question, but we do suggest that compliance with such a policy 
must be based more on rewards than on sanctions. If workers are 
going to be asked to be restrained in their money wage demands, they 
will need other compensations or assurances with respect to their real 
in corne gains. 
Let us now turn to the two other parties in our collective bar-
gaining system management and government. As you know., there is 
no one management organization in Canada which speaks for ail 
employers. We hâve the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian 
Manufacturers Association and numerous industry associations, but none 
of thèse speaks authoratively for ail employers. If Professor John 
Portera claim that our « political system leaves the définition of major 
goals — and therefore the power — to the corporate élite. » 3 certainly 
« the corporate élite » does not define our major goals through any 
central organization. While the thème of this conférence is on union 
structure, we should realize that the structure of management is relevant 
to an adéquate examination of union structure. Expérience in countries 
as diverse in their labour and management structures as Canada and 
Sweden indicates that the structure of one is largely a mirror of the 
other. 
Finally, on the government side, we hâve eleven political juris-
dictions in Canada which greatly influence the shape of, and create 
extensive diversity in, our collective bargaining system. Spécification 
of what constitutes the proper rôle of government in collective bargain-
ing varies according to the ideological orientations of the various 
governments, and it is not at ail uncommon to find différent public 
policy approaches to the same problem. It is our contention that this 
diversity complicates collective bargaining in our major national indus-
tries such as steel, pulp and paper, and méat packing, and gives rise 
to many problems which we would not hâve in the absence of such 
législative and administrative diversity. 
(3) Macleans, June 1968, p. 54. 
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The last time that constitutional jurisdiction over labour-mana-
gement relations received serious attention at the political level was 
in 1946. Since that time our economy has become more highly diver-
sified and interdependent, both of which are essential for efficiency, 
growth and viability. As our politicians proceed with their discussions 
on revising our constitution, we would hope that they will once more 
give this subject serious considération. We suggest this because of 
the major and increasing responsibility that the fédéral government 
has for other aspects of our national économie life, and also because 
of our knowledge of what is de facto taking place in multi-provincial 
bargaining in industries which presently fall under provincial juris-
diction for collective bargaining purposes. 
Let us now turn to a discussion of the process of collective bar-
gaining. 
The Process of Collective Bargaining 
This part of our paper is based on some of the data from our 
« Structure of Collective Bargaining » study which includes ail nego-
tiating units (excluding those in the construction industry) covering 
500 or more employées for the period 1953 to the 2nd quarter of 1966. 
This study has been underway for several years now and we hope to 
complète it this summer. 
The first thing we would like to discuss in this context is the 
structure of negotiating units. We define the negotiating unit as the 
decision-making unit which negotiates changes in the terms of a col-
lective agreement or a number of collective agreements. As you will 
see from Tables 1 and 2, we use a typology including eight types. Table 
1 gives a percentage breakdown by type while Table 2 gives the percen-
tage of employées covered by each type for any given year. 
Comparing Tables 1 and 2, we find that the single establishment-
single union type comprise about 55 percent of ail negotiating untis, but 
covers only about a third of the employées in our study. The multi 
establishment-single union type accounts for approximately 20 percent 
of ail negotiating units and just slightly less than 20 percent of the 
employées. Although single company negotiating units comprise 
slightly over 80 percent of ail negotiating units, they include only about 
60 percent of ail employées covered by the study. 
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While multi company-multi union negotiating units comprise about 
1 percent of the negotiating units, they currently include about 14 
percent of the employées. The drop from 30 percent to 14 percent of 
employées covered by this type between 1953 and 1965 is explained 
largely by decreasing employment on the railroads which are included 
in this category. While the employer association-single union category 
accounts for about 11 percent of ail negotiating units, it includes about 
15 percent of ail employées. On the whole, the tables show that multi 
employer and employer association bargaining account for 20 percent 
of negotiating units and cover about 40 percent of the employées in the 
study. 
The tables also indicate that there is little multi union bargaining 
in Canada. The most notable exceptions to this gênerai statement 
include the railways and the pulp and paper industry. 
We now turn to another aspect of the collective process, namely the 
stages at which settlements were reached. Table 3 gives a breakdown 
by percentage distribution of employées for the years 1953 — 2nd 
quarter 1966. While the figures vary somewhat from year to year, there 
appears to be a number of emerging trends. First, there appears to be 
a decreasing tendency to sertie at the bargaining stage. Second, there 
appears to be an increasing tendency to settle at the conciliation officer 
stage and a decreasing tendency to reach a settlement at the conciliation 
board stage. The latter development probably reflects in part the de-
emphasizing of conciliation boards in some of the provinces. Post-
conciliation settlements hâve increased and settlements reached during 
the course of strikes show a modest upward trend. 
Let us now take a look at the duration of agreements. Table 4 
gives the average length of agreements weighted by employées, and 
indicates that on the average the length of agreements has increased 
from 18.1 months in 1953 to 28.5 months in the first half of 1966. Table 
5 shows some interesting developments by employée coverage. For 
example, in 1953 the 1-year agreement covered about 63 percent of the 
employées in the study, whereas the 3-year agreement covered only a 
little over 1 percent of the employées. In 1965, however, only 15 percent 
of employées were covered by 1-year agreements while about 39 percent 
of employées were covered by collective agreements of 3 years or more. 
The 2-year agreement reached a peak in 1964 and has subsequently 
declined as the 3-year agreement has become more prédominent. The 
last column of Table 5 shows that the percentage of employées covered 
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by multi-year agreements increased from 36.1 percent in 1953 to nearly 
85 percent in 1965. 
There are a number of factors which may account for the increasing 
length of agreements. First, long-term agreements may give the em-
ployer some assurance of « labour peace » for the duration of the agree-
ment and allow him to budget for labour costs with greater précision. 
Secondly, there are so many items now covered by collective agreements 
that both parties may prefer to undertake negotiations less frequently 
than they did when agreements were relatively simple documents. 
Third, earlier long-term agreements provided for the major part of wage 
increases in the first year of the agreement whereas in récent years, 
wage increases are spread more evenly over the life of the agreement. 
This, we suggest, offers a greater incentive for employées to accept 
long-term agreements. Finally, in the early stages of a bargaining 
relationship, there are many conflicts over principles and rights, in-
cluding union security and managements rights. Only after thèse basic 
issues are resolved or satisfactory accommodations are made, will the 
parties to the bargaining relationship move toward longer term agree-
ments. 
With this brief discussion of the process of our collective bargaining 
System, let us now turn to a brief discussion of a few of the outputs of 
the System. 
The Outputs of the Collective Bargaining System 
First, let us examine briefly the behaviour of wages over the period 
1953 — lst quarter 1968. Table 6 présents average annual percentage 
changes in base rates for ail negotiating units covering 500 or more 
employées by signing quarter and by signing year. The table shows 
that the first peak occurred in 1957 when the annual rate was 6.7 percent. 
This peak was not exceeded until 1966 and 1967 when average annual 
percentage changes were 8.0 and 8.6 percent respectively. 
The highest average rate occurred in 1967 at a time when the eco-
ncmy was undergoing mild adjustments. The third and fourth quarter 
figures for 1967 and the first quarter figure for 1968 suggest that we 
might well be entering a period of lower wage increases in the months 
ahead. 
The figures in Table 6 also indicate that wages tend to lag behind 
fluctuations in business activity. This was true, for example, in 1957 
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which was a recession year but also a year in which average annual 
base rate increases reached a peak, following the boom years of 1955-56. 
Also, during the présent prolonged expansion, wage increases lagged 
well behind the upturn in business activity. 
Over the 13y2 years, the average base rate in Canada for those 
covered by the study increased by 63.8 percent for an average yearly 
increase of 4.7 percent. During the same period, the consumer price 
index rose by 25.5 percent or 1.9 percent per year. Real average annual 
base rates increased, therefore, by approximately 39 percent, or about 
3 percent annually which approximates the average annual increase in 
productivity over the period. 
The figures in Table 6, which show an annual increase of 8 percent 
in 1966, also indicate quite clearly that the so-called « Pearson formula » 
cl 30 percent over two years in 1966 did not set a pattern which spread 
uniformly throughout the economy. In fact, settlements in 1966 ranged 
from 5 percent to 71 percent over the life of the contract. While the 
seaway settlement may hâve influenced some subséquent settlements, 
there is no way of measuring precisely its impact on the economy as a 
whole. The évidence we do hâve suggests that it had comparatively 
little influence. 
Another point that should be made is that negotiated wage increases 
from 1961 to 1965 were relatively moderate in comparison to those of 
the last two years. For example, those who signed 3-year agreemenls 
m 1965 received less than those who signed in 1966 and 1967. Con-
sequently, we should not be too surprised if there are a few instances 
where rather high demands are made this year. When the 3-year 
agreements negotiated in 1965 corne up for renewal this year, the unions 
involved and their members may attempt to « catch up » with those who 
obtained the larger increases in 1966 and 1967. 
Although we hâve not included tables on wage changes by région 
or by industry, our tables do indicate that over the 13-year period, ail 
régions, with the exception of British Columbia, show remarkably similar 
increases. This is explained largely by the industrial mix included in 
our study. However, our preliminary analysis suggests that there 
may be little uniformity among industries. But, in the automobile, can, 
steel, logging, méat packing and pulp and paper industries, key settle-
ments within each of thèse industries tend to form a pattern for the 
industry as a whole. In some industries, such as pulp and paper, there 
are two patterns — one in the East and one in the West. 
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Turning now to hours of work, we find that for Canada as a whole, 
there has been little change in the average standard work-day, the figure 
decreasing from 8.2 hours in 1953 to 8.0 hours in 1966. Average hours 
per week decreased slightly from 41.2 in 1953 to 40.1 in 1966. 
Vacation provisions hâve changed substantially since 1953. Longer 
vacations with less service requirenients hâve developed progressively 
over the years. In 1953, for example, about 45 percent of the employées 
covered by our study had provision for three weeks* vacation whereas 
87 percent had such provision in 1966. In 1953, about 12 percent of the 
employées covered in the study had provision for four weeks* vacation 
while in 1966 about 70 percent had such provision. While only 2.1 
percent of employées had provision for a 5-week vacation in 1953, about 
13.6 percent were eligible for 5-weeks in 1966. The service requirenients 
for thèse vacation provisions will be discussed in our « structure of col-
lective bargaining » study. 
More leisure time, therefore, in terms of more paid holidays and 
improved vacations has been a continuing development in agreements 
negotiated during the period 1953-1966. 
Finally, we wish to discuss collective agreement provisions which 
piovide for adjustment to technological change. In 1967, the Collective 
Bargaining Division of the Economies and Research Branch conducted 
a survey of 471 collective agreements, excluding railroads and the cons-
truction industry, which made explicit référence to technological change. * 
Of the 471 agreements, 133 or 28 percent contained explicit technolo-
gical change clauses. On the average, each agreement contained slightly 
more than two explicit clauses. The clauses were grouped into five 
types and were distributed approximately as follows : 
Percent 
Advance notice 19 
Income maintenance 40 
Worker adaptation 19 
Employment sharing 2 
Joint union-management procédures 20 
Income maintenance clauses (which included guaranteed income 
for specified periods plus severance pay) were the most common. 
Advance notice of layoff, workers adaptation (which included retraining 
(4) Collective Bargaining Division, Economies and Research Branch, Canada 
Department of Labour, « Response to Technological Change — A Study of Tech-
nological Change Provisions Contained in Major Collective Agreements Effective 
in Canadian Industries », 1967. 
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and relocation provisions) and joint union-management procédures 
(which included consultation and negotiation) each represented about 
20 percent of the provisions. Employment sharing (which included the 
reduced work week and early retirement) represented only about 2 
percent of the provisions. 
Table 7, which is taken from this study, shows a breakdown by 
industry and number of employées. The wood products industry in-
cluding pulp and paper had by far the largest number of agreements 
v/ith explicit technological change provisions. It is our understanding 
that thèse provisions were written into the pulp and paper agreements 
only within the last couple of years, and that the joint agreement on 
this subject by the Nova Scotia Joint Labour-Management Committee 
acted as a catalyst for the spread of thèse provisions in the Eastern part 
of the industry. It is of interest also that substantially the same kinds 
of provisions hâve been included in the pulp and paper agreements on 
the West coast. 
The 133 agreements which make explicit référence to technological 
change provisions understate the many ways in which adjustment to 
technological change takes place. While such provisions as SUB plans, 
pension plans, seniority arrangements, etc. were not designed originally 
to cushion the impact of technological change, there is scattered évidence 
to suggest that thèse provisions are being modified and used for this 
purpose. What we find of interest in the study referred to above, 
however, is that labour and management in thèse cases hâve verbalized 
their growing concern with the impact of technological change on 
employées. We would predict that a similar study conducted several 
years from now would show greater explicit référence to technological 
change provisions. 
Some Concluding Observations 
In concluding, we would like to state in summary form what we 
see as some of the major emerging and/or necessary changes in our 
collective bargaining System. 
First, there is need for a more explicit définition of our national 
économie and social goals and better organization to achieve them. 
While governments must play a leading rôle in this development, there 
is also an essential rôle for labour, management, consumers and other 
groups in defining our goals more precisely and in the development or 
restructuring of their organizations to assists in the implementation of 
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our national objectives. This will require stronger organizations and a 
genuine willingness to work together for the good of the whole country. 
It might also require a shift in the distribution of power to the fédéral 
government to give it sufficient authority to plan employment, pro-
duction and équitable income distribution on a long-term basis. 
Second, national Systems of collective bargaining must be developed 
and recognized for our essential national industries. This may require 
a re-distribution of législative authority in the industrial relations field. 
Already multi-provincial bargaining exists in such industries as pulp 
and paper, méat packing, automobile manufacturing and steel. Présent 
jurisdictional barriers may hâve to be removed so that in thèse and other 
basic industries collective bargaining can take place on a national or 
multi-provincial basis. 
Third, we believe that the number of unions should be reduced 
gradually to form strong industrial unions. This would require highly 
responsible and responsive union leaders to protect and safeguard the 
rights of the various occupational groups within thèse industrial unions. 
If such unions did not set up internai procédures to safeguard the 
démocratie rights of their members, then the public authorities might 
be required to do so. The U.S. Landrum-Griffin Act is a good example 
of what the public authorities will do where they believe that there has 
been an abuse of private power. We also believe that stronger national 
associations of employers are needed for the evolvement of improved 
national policies for the management of industrial and personnel rela-
tions. This kind of restructuring would f acilitate the development of 
strong and responsible national Systems of collective bargaining which, 
we believe, would be in the national interest. 
Finally, we suggest that productivity bargaining may well become 
more prévalent in the future. Productivity has always been a factor at 
the bargaining table, although sometimes inconspicuously. It has been 
an explicit factor in collective bargaining in the steel industry for years, 
both in terms of national comparisons and comparisons with the U.S. 
steel industry. Recently, as you know, it has been an issue in bargaining 
in the automobile and farm implements industry. The plumbers in 
Victoria signed an agreement in November 1967 which tied wage 
increases to increases in the cost of living and in productivity. Canadair 
in Montréal also signed a « productivity agreement » in 1967. Thèse 
agreements and the désire on the part of unions to reduce or eliminate 
geographical differentials in national and international industries will 
no doubt bring emphasis to productivity bargaining in the years ahead. 
TABLE 1 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NEGOTIATINC UNITS ( a ) BY TYPE : 
CANADA 1953-1966 
Type of 
Negotiation Unit 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Single Company 
Single Establishment, 
Single Union 55.3 54.3 54.4 53.8 55.3 57.4 53.8 54.7 56.4 55.8 56.3 56.2 56.1 58.2 
Single Establishment, 
Multi-Union 3.4 2.6 4.4 4.9 4.6 4.6 5.4 5.3 5.1 4.4 4.4 4.5 3.7 5.4 
Multi-Establishment, 
Single Union 21.2 22.2 20.8 20.5 20.4 18.4 18.1 19.2 18.9 18.5 17.7 18.4 18.5 15.2 
Multi-Establishment, 
Multi-Union 1.9 1.7 3.7 3.6 2.5 2.6 3.1 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.5 
Multi Company 
Single Union 3.4 3.4 3.7 4.2 4.3 3.9 5.9 6.4 5.9 6.4 5.9 6.2 6.1 5.7 
Multi-Union . . 1.9 2.6 1.5 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.3 
Employer Association 
Single Union 11.5 12.0 10.6 10.4 10.8 11.2 11.9 10.8 9.8 10.5 11.1 10.5 11.2 11.7 
Multi-Union 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.9 
TOTAL <*>) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(a)
 Figures are expressed as a percentage of negotiations which hâve taken place and vvhere the agreements arrived at are in 
existence on December 31st of each year. 
(h) Column may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
TABLE 2 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYÉES ( a ) ACCORDING TO TYPE NEGOTIATTNG UNIT : 
CANADA, 1953-1966 
Type of 
Negotiattng Unit 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 196& 
Single Company 
Single Establishment, 
Single Union 30.8 30.5 32.5 33.2 32.4 33.0 34.3 35.1 34.2 34.3 34.0 33.9 34.3 38.3 
Single Establishment, 
Multi-Union 1.1 1.1 1.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.7 2.9 4.3 
Multi-Establishment, 
Single Union 19.6 19.4 18.6 20.4 21.2 21.8 20.9 20.0 20.2 21.3 21.8 23.6 22.2 24.1 
Multi-Establishment, 
Multi-Union 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 3.6 4.2 
Multi-Company 
Single Union 1.3 1,3 1.8 2.5 2.5 2.7 4.0 5.5 6.4 6.6 5.6 5.6 5.9 6.8 
Multi-Union 29.9 30.0 28 6 24.3 24.3 22.6 19.9 18.0 17.7 16.3 15.9 14.1 14.1 1.1 
Employer Association 
Single Union 14.4 14.5 138 13.2 13.5 14.2 14.7 15.1 15.0 15.0 16.0 15.8 15.6 19.1 
MulU-Union 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 
TOTAL <b> 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(a) Figures are expressed as a percentage of employées who are covered by collective agreements arrived at by the type of nego-
tiating unit indicated. The agreements are thèse in existence as of December 31st of each year and arise from negotiation 
involving 500 or more employées. 
(b)
 Coiumns may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
T A B L E 3 
PERCENT ÂGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYÉES ACCORDING TO THE STAGE AT WHICH THEIR 
NÉGOCIATIONS ENDED : CANADA 1953-1966 
Stage 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
(») 
Bargaining 61.6 
Conciliation Officer 2.9 
Conciliation Board 26.6 
Post-Conciliation Bargaining . 5.3 
Arbitration — 
Post-Arbitration Bargaining . . — 
Strike 1.8 
Post-Strike Bargaining . . . . — 
Not Recorded 1.9 
38.7 62.5 52.1 62.8 30.6 50.3 67.4 32.7 38.2 64.9 27.7 41.7 38.1 
10.0 2.8 2.4 0.9 10.9 9.2 12.7 20.9 16.2 9.2 25.2 22.0 10.3 
15.3 28.7 14.0 27.0 19.9 13.2 15.6 8.8 32.4 9.3 8.4 13.3 26.5 
1.1 1.5 25.9 2.0 33.5 8.6 2.3 36.4 5.8 11.8 29.3 11.3 10.8 
30.9 — — — 
0.1 
4.3 
0.2 — — 2.1 1.0 
0.2 
3.6 
0.9 0.8 0.9 
2.6 3.8 5.4 6.8 9.4 2.0 0.9 4.9 8.7 9.9 13.5 
— 0.5 — __ 0.4 9.0 _ _ „ — 0.4 — — 0.7 — 
1.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 — — 0.3 — — — 0.3 — 
<a)
 Columns may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
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TABLE 4 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE LENGTH OF CONTRACTS 
Average Length Total Number 
Signing Year of Contract of Employées 
(months) ('000) 
1953 18.1 329 
1954 18.8 473 
1955 16.1 331 
1956 23.0 574 
1957 18.6 266 
1958 21.9 435 
1959 22.7 370 
1960 21.5 272 
1961 22.2 443 
1962 24.2 461 
1963 25.4 281 
1964 25.1 408 
1965 27.9 289 
1966 * 28.5 139 
* To the end of the second quarter of 1966. 
T A B L E 5 
EMPLOYÉES COVERED BY NEGOTIATIONS RESULTING IN COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
CLASSIFIED BY DURATION AND YEAR O F SIGNING 
( '000) 
Year of 
Signing 
Less than 
11 Months 
No % 
11-13 Months 
No % 
24-22 Months 
No % 
23-25 Months 
No % 
26-34 Months 
No % 
35-37 Months 
No % 
Greater 
than 
37 Months 
No % 
Total 
Employées 
Covered 
Percentage 
of Employée» 
Covered by 
Negotiations 
Resulting in 
Multi-year 
Agreements 
1953 2 0.7 209 63.4 29 8.8 79 23.9 6 1.9 4 1.1 1 0.2 330 36.1 
1954 16 3.4 192 40.6 25 5.3 229 48.5 1 0.2 9 1.9 — — 472 55.9 
1955 15 4.5 196 59.2 27 8.2 82 24.8 3 0.8 8 2.5 — — 331 36.3 
1956 9 1.5 116 20.1 47 8.2 320 55.7 27 4.7 44 7.7 11 2.0 574 78.2 
1957 7 2.6 139 52.4 11 4.1 84 31.6 3 1.0 15 5.5 7 2.7 266 45.1 
1958 6 1.3 105 24.1 36 8.3 231 53.1 7 1.5 41 9.4 10 2.3 436 74.5 
1959 4 1.0 82 22.1 43 11.5 174 47.0 12 3.4 44 11.9 12 3.2 371 76.8 
1960 1 0.3 97 35.6 9 3.4 121 44.3 11 4.0 27 10.0 7 2.4 273 64.1 
1961 1 0.2 132 29.7 19 4.3 213 48.1 12 2.7 60 13.6 6 1.4 443 70.0 
1962 1 0.3 87 18.8 5 1.1 273 59.2 16 3.3 65 14.1 14 3.1 461 80.9 
1963 4 1.5 46 16.2 13 4.7 128 45.3 6 2.0 79 28.1 6 2.2 282 82.3 
1 0.3 47 n A 1 A 1 K 249 61.1 34 8.4 57 14.0 K 1.1 407 88.2 
1965 1 0.3 44 15.0 13 4.6 81 28.0 36 12.6 104 35.9 10 3.6 289 84.4 
1966 1 0.5 17 11.9 6 4.1 42 29.9 8 6.0 64 46.1 2 1.5 140 87.1 
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TABLE 6 
A\I:RAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN BASE RATES OVER THE LIFE OF THE 
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS FOR ALL NEGOTIATTNG UNITS OF 500 OR MORE 
EMPLOYÉES COMPLETED IN ANY GIVEN QIJARTER 
Year Quarterly Annual Year Quarterly 
1953 1 6.7 1961 1 6.3 
2 4.5 3.9 2 3.8 
3 3.8 3 1.9 
4 2.9 4 3.6 
1954 1 5.2 1962 1 3,1 
2 4.7 2 4.2 
3 1.6 3.3 3 3.6 
4 2.7 4 3.5 
1955 1 3.8 1963 1 4.4 
2 3.1 2 3.0 
3 4.0 4.0 3 3.3 
4 5.7 4 3.2 
1956 1 5.2 1964 1 4.7 
2 5.6 2 4.5 
3 5.5 5.4 3 5.2 
4 5.2 4 4.8 
1957 1 6.3 1965 1 4.4 
2 6.7 2 5.0 
3 7.0 6.7 3 6.1 
4 6.3 4 6.4 
1958 1 5.0 1966 1 7.5 
2 4.9 2 9.3 
3 4.2 4.0 3 7.5 
4 3.2 4 7.9 
1959 1 3.4 1967 1 8.9 
2 3.8 2 9.2 
3 4.4 4.2 3 7.9 
4 5.2 4 8.6 
1960 1 
2 
3 
4 
4.5 
5.0 
4.9 
3.9 
4.6 
1968 1 7.4 
Annual 
3.5 
3.7 
3.3 
4.9 
5.6 
8.0 
8.6 
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TABLE 7 
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF AGREEMENTS CoNTArNiNG TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
PROVISIONS BY SECTOR AND INDUSTRY AND EMPLOYÉES COVERED 
NOTE—Caution should be exercised in the interprétation of this table. The survey 
included only agreements covering 500 or more workers. Therefore, to the 
extent that some industries are composed of a proportionately great number 
of firms with less than 500 workers, they will not be adequately represented 
in the survey. 
Sector and Industry __ 
PRIMARY : 
Logging 
Dairy 
Mining 
MANUFACTURING : 
Food & Beverages 
Tobacco & Products 
Textiles & Apparel 
Wood Products including Pulp & Paper . . 
Printing, Publishing & Allied Industries . . 
Métal Processing & Fabricating 
Machinery & Transportation Equipment . . 
Non-metal Minerai Processing & Fabricating 
Chemicals 
TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE, 
COMMUNICATION & UTILITIES: 
Air Transport & Airports 
Bus & Coach Transport 
Urban & Suburban Transport 
Truck Transport 
Water Transport & Related Services . . . 
Grain Elevators 
Radio & T.V. Broadcasting 
Electric Power 
TRADE 
PUBLIC SERVICE : 
TOTAL 
Agreements Employ* ees 
No. % No. % 
9 2 6,300 1 
2 * 2,350 * 
2 * 2,170 * 
3 * 1,920 * 
5 1 4,105 * 
9 2 21,917 3 
36 8 56,685 8 
6 1 5,420 * 
8 2 12,360 2 
16 4 42,187 6 
4 * 3,238 * 
1 * 1,200 * 
2 * 2,133 * 
1 * 640 * 
2 * 5,950 * 
3 * 10,000 1 
3 * 3,694 * 
1 * 1,000 * 
3 * 5,600 * 
6 1 15,905 2 
1 * 2,900 * 
10 2 17,699 2 
133 28 225,373 32 
* Less than 1% of total. 
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LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE: QUESQUES PERSPECTIVES 
INTRODUCTION 
Nous tenterons, dans le présent article de faire ressortir ce que nous considé-
rons les facteurs importants dans notre système de négociation collective, facteurs 
pertinents à la discussion des structures syndicales. 
L E CONTEXTE SOCIO-ÉCONOMIQUE 
a ) L'implication de plus en plus grande du public dans l'établissement des 
buts de la société ; 
b ) La société canadienne en est une d'opulence; 
c ) Nous vivons dans une société caractérisée par de rapides changements dans 
la technologie, l'économique et l'édifice social de notre nation ; 
d ) Depuis six ans, nous avons connu une période de prospérité sans précédent 
accompagnée d'augmentation des prix et des coûts ; 
e) Notre système de sécurité sociale représente un méli-mélo de programmes 
publics et privés. 
LES PARTIS DANS LE SYSTÈME DE NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
Même si la CSN semble exercer un plus grand contrôle sur ses affiliés que le 
CTC, on peut se demander si chacune de ces organisations agit sur et au nom 
de leurs affiliés de façon suffisante pour influencer la direction et l'implantation 
des politiques et des programmes nationaux dans une société comme la nôtre. 
Du côté patronal, on doit noter au départ l'absence d'une organisation nationale 
représentative de tous les employeurs. Il est alors difficile pour eux de s'exprimer 
sur la définition des buts dans notre société. 
Les 11 gouvernements canadiens ont des idéologies différentes quant au rôle 
qu'ils doivent jouer dans la négociation collective. Ceci n'est pas sans compliquer 
la situation d'autant plus que nous faisons face à 11 législations du travail diffé-
rentes. 
L E PROCESSUS DE NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
a) La structure des unités de négociation 
Nous définissons unité de négociation comme étant l'unité de prise de décisions 
qui négocie des changements en termes de conventions collectives ou de nombre 
de conventions collectives. 
Suite à une foule de statistiques, il est possible de conclure qu'il y a peu de 
négociations collectives impliquant plusieurs syndicats au Canada. 
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b) Etapes favorables aux ententes 
On peut tirer quelques tendances : 
1.—on tend de moins en moins à être d'accord au niveau de la simple négo-
ciation ; 
2.—on tend de plus en plus à signer les ententes au niveau de l'intervention 
du conciliateur et de moins en moins au niveau du « conciliation board ». 
c) La durée des conventions 
La durée moyenne des conventions collectives a passé de 18.1 mois en 1953 
à 28.5 mois en 1966. Cela serait dû aux causes suivantes : 
1.—les employeurs croient à la plus grande probabilité de paix industrielle 
avec un accord de plus longue durée et peuvent établir avec plus de pré-
cision les coûts du facteur travail ; 
2.—les négociations sont devenues tellement complexes que les parties préfèrent 
les distancer le plus possible ; 
3.—les augmentations de salaires sont plus en plus réparties également sur 
toute la durée de la convention ; 
4.—après avoir réglé les problèmes tels la sécurité syndicale et les droits de 
la direction, les parties passent à des accords de plus longue durée. 
L E S RESULTATS DU SYSTÈME DE NEGOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
On remarque des changements substantiels dans les clauses de conventions 
collectives touchant les salaires, les heures de travail, les congés paj'és, les jours 
fériés et les changements technologiques. 
CONCLUSION 
Résumons les changements que nous considérons comme nécessaires dans 
notre système de négociation collective. 
1.—Une définition plus explicite de nos objectifs économiques et sociaux et 
une meilleure organisation pour les atteindre ; 
2.—Un système national de négociation collective doit être conçu et reconnu 
pour nos industries essentielles nationales ; 
3.—Le nombre des syndicats devrait être réduit graduellement afin de former 
des syndicats industriels forts ; 
4.—La négociation basée sur la productivité deviendra dominante dans l'avenir. 
